Venezuela and Columbia have had a tumultuous recent history with threats, counter-threats, border skirmishes and contested border crossings demolished, and yet what does it all mean? Is this a great struggle between the decadent capitalist pawn and the ongoing socialist revolution? Chavez's rhetoric would lead one to arrive at that conclusion, and in theory could lead to an, albeit small-time, arms race. If this were to happen Venezuela would probably win with its natural resource superiority, barring some significant increase in military aid to Columbia. That being said this is a perfect opportunity to use a neo-containment policy.
Venezuela has the benefit of sitting on some of the largest known oil reserves in the western hemisphere, and in theory could use revenues from that to fund social spending, like Norway, but instead chooses to spend it on military hardware including 400 helicopters and 100,000 AK-103s (one of most advanced small arms in the world). These purchases indicate great wealth and sound fiscal policy right? Wrong, earlier this year the government of Venezuela nationalized a French grocery store chain after it "raised it's prices" in response to a 50% devaluation of the Bolivar, the national currency.
Such devaluation demonstrates a series lack in economic planning and merely shows Chavez's attempts to externalize internal problems. The problem is not the raising of prices by the store, but the fiscal and monetary problems of the Chavez government.
The US, and its allies in South America, should:
1. Strengthen ties between Columbia, Guyana and Brazil to isolate Venezuela politically and economically.
2. Build intergovernmental and inter-institutional laboratories, "collaboratories" if you will, using the National Renewable Energy Laboratory to help reduce the wealth generated by Venezuela's oil fields.
3. Use the increased presence of US troops in Columbia to train for low-intensity conflicts and cross-border raids.
4. Rebuff any attempts by Chavez to escalate militarily, i.e. defend but do not pursue/retaliate. While this will be unpopular to the masses in Columbia it will not allow Chavez to point towards outside aggression to further his policies. In addition, an increase in the use of radio communication to reach the masses inside Venezuela would serve to undermine the Chavez regime and perhaps as a side-benefit undercut the FARC movement within Columbia
Ultimately, change will come from within as the economic policies of Chavez fail to increase the general welfare of Venezuelans. Generally, this is a case of "if we don't lose, we win," and the waiting game is the best policy.
Some of the sources used for this post:
http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/6963-colombia-and-venezuela-quarrel-over-bombed-border-bridges.html
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2009/11/2009112004914250182.html
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8369612.stm
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703569004575009420323919964.html
http://kirk.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=336&Itemid=93
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5045208.stm
http://www.nrel.gov/news/press/2007/498.html
07 February 2010
13 December 2009
Settlement of the Af-Pak Border Along the Durrand Line
The Taliban, Al Qaeda and other extremists operate with relative impunity along the border of Afghanistan Pakistan Pakistan
This safe-haven is formed in part because the Pakistani Government does not exercise sovereignty over all of its land, likewise the Afghani Government, and furthermore, the two do not cooperate over border security. The border is still that which the British Indian Empire negotiated in 1893 to create a buffer against Russian expansion.
The Durand Line (and its continuation as the present border) resulted from an internationally recognized treaty between the British Government and the Emir of Afghanistan. Problems with the Durand Line as a formal border arise in part because portions of the border were not demarcated, and furthermore in “1949 a Loya Jirga (Council of Tribes) repudiated all treaties with the British, including the Durand Line, (Mekenkamp, 2002: 254). Afghanistan Pakistan Pakistan Afghanistan Pakistan Pakistan
[The] Durand Line delineated in the 1893 treaty is a valid international boundary subsequently recognized and confirmed by Afghanistan Pakistan British India derived full sovereignty over this region and its people and has all the rights and obligation of a successor state. In addition, the question of self-determination for Pashtuns was foreclosed by the British supervised plebiscite held in 1947 in NWFP in which 99 percent of votes cast were in favor of joining Pakistan
This is not a bold new strategy; this is exactly the dispute between India Pakistan Rann of Kutch . When submitted to the International Court of Justice with a binding resolution two parties can arrive at a solution acceptable to all. See the Appendices for maps of the disputed Rann of Kutch area, before and after. The Durand Line dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan presents a golden opportunity. Unlike the Rann of Kutch the Durrand Line follows Mountain ranges and rivers, making for a natural boundary.
View Larger Map
The existence of old treaties allows the rule of law to come into play, while pressure from international society will force the governments to talks, allowing for a multi-level approach to this conflict. In short a successful conclusion to this dispute will go a long way towards reconciliation between the states, which will, in turn, lead to a more effective and coherent strategy against extremists in the area.
View Larger Map
The existence of old treaties allows the rule of law to come into play, while pressure from international society will force the governments to talks, allowing for a multi-level approach to this conflict. In short a successful conclusion to this dispute will go a long way towards reconciliation between the states, which will, in turn, lead to a more effective and coherent strategy against extremists in the area.
Appendices
Pre-ICJ Ruling on the Rann of Kutch
Post ICJ Ruling and Subsequent Demarcation
Sources for this article:
Chirico, Pete and Michael Warner. 2005. “Sheet: I 42-6.” Mosaic of digital raster Soviet topographic maps of Afghanistan Reston , VA US
Ganguly, Sumit. 2001. Conflict Unending. [New York Columbia University
The Geographer. 1998. “India-Pakistan Boundary: the Rann of Kutch Sector.” International Boundary Study. [Washington D.C.
Friedman, Thomas L. 2005. The World is Flat. [New York
Khattak, Iqbal. “The circumstances are propitious for a final settlement of the border between Pakistan Afghanistan July 18-24, 2003 Vol. XV, No. 21
“Islamkot , Pakistan India Washington D.C.
“Islamkot , Pakistan India AMS . Series: U502. Sheet: NG 42-15. [Washington D.C.
Mekenkamp, Monique, Paul van Tongeren, and Hans van de Veen, eds. 2002. Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia . [Boulder
Rao, H. S. Gururaja. 2002. Legal Aspects of the Kashmir Problem. [New Delhi
Rubin, Barnett R. and Abubakar Siddique. 2006. Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate. [Washington D.C.
“Satellite Image of Section of ‘Durand Line’ Vicinity of Chitral , Pakistan
Thakur, Ramesh and Oddny Wiggen eds. 2004. South Asia in the world: Problem solving perspectives on security, sustainable development, and good governance. [New York Nations University
04 November 2009
Pakistan's Logistical Nightmare
Pakistan makes the news almost every day now. Headlines like: Another Bomb Blast in Peshawar, Army Assaults Taliban Stronghold, and so on. What doesn't make headlines is the logistical problems of Pakistan's Army arising from a relatively simple matter: small arms.
Pakistan's wide-array of small arms is a great look into its history of military partners. The countries of origin include, the US, Russia, China, Germany, Belgium. Nominally, this is not an issue, but in actuality this variety of small arms fires a variety of cartridges using a variety of magazines. Most of the Chinese and Russian weapons fire a 7.62 x 39mm round, while the Belgian and US rifles fire a 5.56 x 45mm round. The German G3 fires a 7.62 x 51mm round which is not compatible with the Russian and Chinese rifles. Each of these different sized rounds has a different magazine type as well.
If soldiers in battle cannot share ammunition or magazines with each other this can have the effect of being a negative combat-multiplier, i.e. if a soldier is afraid of running out of ammunition because he/she knows that the soldier next to him/her cannot share ammo, they will shoot less. This problem is compounded by the fact that an already complex resupply process is now further complicated. Logistics personnel must not just bring ammo, they must to bring the right quantities of three separate types of ammo, not counting light or heavy machine guns or any other weapon systems.
The Pakistani Government doesn't have the resources to train and familiarize its troops with the nine different assault rifles it equips. They would do much better to decrease the variety of rifles/ammunition size and thus remove a negative combat multiplier, making their troops more efficient in the field and easier to resupply.
Pakistani soldier with G3 (7.62x51 NATO)
(Courtesy of http://johnibii.wordpress.com/category/mohammed-alam-khattak/)
With Type 56/AK-47 (7.62x39 mm)
(Courtesy of Pakistan Defence Forum)
Pakistan's wide-array of small arms is a great look into its history of military partners. The countries of origin include, the US, Russia, China, Germany, Belgium. Nominally, this is not an issue, but in actuality this variety of small arms fires a variety of cartridges using a variety of magazines. Most of the Chinese and Russian weapons fire a 7.62 x 39mm round, while the Belgian and US rifles fire a 5.56 x 45mm round. The German G3 fires a 7.62 x 51mm round which is not compatible with the Russian and Chinese rifles. Each of these different sized rounds has a different magazine type as well.
If soldiers in battle cannot share ammunition or magazines with each other this can have the effect of being a negative combat-multiplier, i.e. if a soldier is afraid of running out of ammunition because he/she knows that the soldier next to him/her cannot share ammo, they will shoot less. This problem is compounded by the fact that an already complex resupply process is now further complicated. Logistics personnel must not just bring ammo, they must to bring the right quantities of three separate types of ammo, not counting light or heavy machine guns or any other weapon systems.
The Pakistani Government doesn't have the resources to train and familiarize its troops with the nine different assault rifles it equips. They would do much better to decrease the variety of rifles/ammunition size and thus remove a negative combat multiplier, making their troops more efficient in the field and easier to resupply.
(Courtesy of http://johnibii.wordpress.com/category/mohammed-alam-khattak/)
With Type 56/AK-47 (7.62x39 mm)
(Courtesy of Pakistan Defence Forum)
With FN2000 (5.56x45 NATO)
(Courtesy of Pakistan Defence Forum)
01 November 2009
Long-Run Counter Insurgency Sri Lanka
In late May of this year Sri Lanka's Government declared victory over the Tamil Tigers ending a 26 year long civil war. Engagements in this conflict ranged from classic hit-and-run insurgency to pitched stand-and-fight battles. One of the most sophisticated rebel movements in the world the Tamil Tigers had an army, navy, and fledgling air force. They also pioneered/refined the widespread use of suicide bombers. According to the BBC the conflict started after ethnic Tamils felt discriminated against during successive Sinhalese governments. This leaves multiple scenarios which could play out in Sri Lanka to the population's benefit or woe.
Scenario One, "Best Case":
In this scenario the current government and successive government initiate massive reconstruction projects in the former Tiger's territory, and provides security. In addition the physical changes that reconstruction brings in this scenario the government increases education, economic opportunities and most importantly representation in successive governments. In the long run if any escaped Tamil Tigers make it back to Sri Lanka they will find a public unwilling to take up arms again, because all the grievances that existed previously have been removed.
This scenario is not just a "best case" but seems to be the direction in which the government is going. USAID is running a program to help rehabilitate former combatants, while the Chinese government has provided equipment at concession prices to the tune of ~$17 Billion. In addition the government has acquired five additional for a total of 19 de-mining machines to speed up the removal of unexploded ordinance/mines. While this last fact might seem small, the worldwide economic costs of loss of farmland and medical costs to people disabled by unexploded ordinance or mines, is huge. According to the UN:
"From another standpoint, landmines often stop the economy of a nation. Most minefields are unmarked and cannot be distinguished from the surrounding countryside. Generally, the first sign the people in an area have of the existence of a minefiled is when a friend or family member is injured or killed. Since this is such a serious matter, local civilians are forced to avoid any area in which a person is known to have died due to a landmine. This means that the explosion of even one mine may make a road, playground or a rice paddy unusable. In areas where there is a shortage of food, people are sometimes forced to take the risk and work the fields that might be mined."
Emphasis must be placed on the youth and young adult groups because they are the potential combatants for the next conflict. This rehabilitation movement is one that will last multiple generations and will be costly, but will remove the chance of Tamil Tiger resurgence. Also the economic incentives should result in higher incomes for Tamils which will ultimately increase revenues to the state through taxes.
Scenario Two "Most Dangerous"
This scenario is essentially a do nothing scenario. Having been successful militarily the government demines the north while not actually changing the socio-political landscape. Representation of Tamil minorities remains low and the north and east remains impoverished and ripe for Tiger resurgence. While at this stage in the game this scenario seems unlikely a change in government could easily roll back all the progress that has been done. Many Sri Lankans will look at the expenditure of the government on the north and east and may feel resentful that the perceived wealth is not being spread on their communities. These citizens would forget what the costs of the 20 year conflict were.
The government must remember that the logistics and financial network of the Tigers still exists and is waiting for new leadership cadres, which will be formed from today's youth and young adults. The prejudices of the parents will be passed on the children and tensions will rise to the tinderbox level where one miscalculation will result in widespread unrest and subsequent repression.
Scenario Three "The Middle Ground"
In this case either the present government loses interest in reconstruction, education, economic opportunities, etc., or a successive government rolls back many of the initiatives started by the present one. While the region might be restive in the short-run a lack of change would make the population receptive to separatist sentiment. The Tigers would be reborn in later generations and the conflict would be renewed at great cost to all Sri Lankans.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2405347.stm
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8056752.stm
http://www.colombopage.com/archive_091/Oct1256910287RA.html
http://www.colombopage.com/archive_091/Oct1256912997CH.html
http://www.colombopage.com/archive_091/Oct1256738892RA.html
http://www.colombopage.com/archive_091/Oct1256737501KA.html
http://www.colombopage.com/archive_091/Nov1257348797RA.html
Scenario One, "Best Case":
In this scenario the current government and successive government initiate massive reconstruction projects in the former Tiger's territory, and provides security. In addition the physical changes that reconstruction brings in this scenario the government increases education, economic opportunities and most importantly representation in successive governments. In the long run if any escaped Tamil Tigers make it back to Sri Lanka they will find a public unwilling to take up arms again, because all the grievances that existed previously have been removed.
This scenario is not just a "best case" but seems to be the direction in which the government is going. USAID is running a program to help rehabilitate former combatants, while the Chinese government has provided equipment at concession prices to the tune of ~$17 Billion. In addition the government has acquired five additional for a total of 19 de-mining machines to speed up the removal of unexploded ordinance/mines. While this last fact might seem small, the worldwide economic costs of loss of farmland and medical costs to people disabled by unexploded ordinance or mines, is huge. According to the UN:
"From another standpoint, landmines often stop the economy of a nation. Most minefields are unmarked and cannot be distinguished from the surrounding countryside. Generally, the first sign the people in an area have of the existence of a minefiled is when a friend or family member is injured or killed. Since this is such a serious matter, local civilians are forced to avoid any area in which a person is known to have died due to a landmine. This means that the explosion of even one mine may make a road, playground or a rice paddy unusable. In areas where there is a shortage of food, people are sometimes forced to take the risk and work the fields that might be mined."
Emphasis must be placed on the youth and young adult groups because they are the potential combatants for the next conflict. This rehabilitation movement is one that will last multiple generations and will be costly, but will remove the chance of Tamil Tiger resurgence. Also the economic incentives should result in higher incomes for Tamils which will ultimately increase revenues to the state through taxes.
Scenario Two "Most Dangerous"
This scenario is essentially a do nothing scenario. Having been successful militarily the government demines the north while not actually changing the socio-political landscape. Representation of Tamil minorities remains low and the north and east remains impoverished and ripe for Tiger resurgence. While at this stage in the game this scenario seems unlikely a change in government could easily roll back all the progress that has been done. Many Sri Lankans will look at the expenditure of the government on the north and east and may feel resentful that the perceived wealth is not being spread on their communities. These citizens would forget what the costs of the 20 year conflict were.
The government must remember that the logistics and financial network of the Tigers still exists and is waiting for new leadership cadres, which will be formed from today's youth and young adults. The prejudices of the parents will be passed on the children and tensions will rise to the tinderbox level where one miscalculation will result in widespread unrest and subsequent repression.
Scenario Three "The Middle Ground"
In this case either the present government loses interest in reconstruction, education, economic opportunities, etc., or a successive government rolls back many of the initiatives started by the present one. While the region might be restive in the short-run a lack of change would make the population receptive to separatist sentiment. The Tigers would be reborn in later generations and the conflict would be renewed at great cost to all Sri Lankans.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2405347.stm
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8056752.stm
http://www.colombopage.com/archive_091/Oct1256910287RA.html
http://www.colombopage.com/archive_091/Oct1256912997CH.html
http://www.colombopage.com/archive_091/Oct1256738892RA.html
http://www.colombopage.com/archive_091/Oct1256737501KA.html
http://www.colombopage.com/archive_091/Nov1257348797RA.html
21 October 2009
Indian Posturing Towards the Chinese
According to the Times of India and the Times Now the cream of India's cruise missile crop the BrahMos is in the process of being deployed to Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir to posture against China. This deployment is probably to Leh because of both the facilities already existing and their proximity to the disputed territory of Aksai Chin.
This is an obvious example of posturing due to a variety of facts. First, the missiles themselves have too short of a range (~290 km) to hit the "strategic targets" mentioned by the Times of India and the Times Now. Second, reports in the videos also mention armored units moving to that location as well. As one can see in the image below (Click to enlarge) the terrain is not favorable to massed armor without the addition of a division of engineers.
Given the rows of mountain ranges facing the Indian tankers before even reaching the frontier, it would take but a few battalions of Chinese infantry with any of the HJ series anti-tank missiles to make 60 ton road blocks of India's T-90 and Arjun main battle tanks. Furthermore, the resupply of the aforementioned tanks (especially POL) would be even harder, making any foray short in duration. Likewise use of of the Karakorum Pass is out due to its narrowness (~45 m) and even passed through offers no access to better armor terrain.
The one problem with this take is that India would have virtual air superiority in the short-run due to the proximity of airbases at Leh (lower left on the map) and Srinagar (off the map to the west), there are no comparable Chinese airbases within hundreds of miles. This would allow India to theoretically paralyze Chinese ground force mobility in the short-run.
Though it should be noted that a city east of Hotan, China, has an interesting series of long wide roads that looks suspiciously like an airstrip.
View Larger Map
Regardless of the placement of military assets on both sides it would be foolish for the Indians to actually do anything. While the Aksai Chin area is still claimed by India, there is nothing but pride for which to fight, and should India take the disputed territory, it would truly be a Pyrrhic victory and would only bolster Chinese support of Pakistan. What is the most surprising about the open acknowledgment of these deployments is that the Pakistanis have not responded at all. A survey of three Pakistani English-language sources reveals nothing on the matter at all, which is highly unusual for the Pakistani GHQ considering a deployment of troops to their relative border with super-sonic missiles just out of range of Islamabad.
Some sources initiating this post:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/videos/news/BrahMos-to-be-deployed-in-Ladakh/videoshow/5112920.cms
http://www.timesnow.tv/BrahMos-to-be-deployed-in-Ladakh/articleshow/4329414.cms
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Be-vigilant-against-China-says-PM/articleshow/5142931.cms
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/China-projects-Kashmir-as-a-separate-country-/articleshow/5139315.cms
This is an obvious example of posturing due to a variety of facts. First, the missiles themselves have too short of a range (~290 km) to hit the "strategic targets" mentioned by the Times of India and the Times Now. Second, reports in the videos also mention armored units moving to that location as well. As one can see in the image below (Click to enlarge) the terrain is not favorable to massed armor without the addition of a division of engineers.
Given the rows of mountain ranges facing the Indian tankers before even reaching the frontier, it would take but a few battalions of Chinese infantry with any of the HJ series anti-tank missiles to make 60 ton road blocks of India's T-90 and Arjun main battle tanks. Furthermore, the resupply of the aforementioned tanks (especially POL) would be even harder, making any foray short in duration. Likewise use of of the Karakorum Pass is out due to its narrowness (~45 m) and even passed through offers no access to better armor terrain.
The one problem with this take is that India would have virtual air superiority in the short-run due to the proximity of airbases at Leh (lower left on the map) and Srinagar (off the map to the west), there are no comparable Chinese airbases within hundreds of miles. This would allow India to theoretically paralyze Chinese ground force mobility in the short-run.
View Larger Map
Regardless of the placement of military assets on both sides it would be foolish for the Indians to actually do anything. While the Aksai Chin area is still claimed by India, there is nothing but pride for which to fight, and should India take the disputed territory, it would truly be a Pyrrhic victory and would only bolster Chinese support of Pakistan. What is the most surprising about the open acknowledgment of these deployments is that the Pakistanis have not responded at all. A survey of three Pakistani English-language sources reveals nothing on the matter at all, which is highly unusual for the Pakistani GHQ considering a deployment of troops to their relative border with super-sonic missiles just out of range of Islamabad.
Some sources initiating this post:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/videos/news/BrahMos-to-be-deployed-in-Ladakh/videoshow/5112920.cms
http://www.timesnow.tv/BrahMos-to-be-deployed-in-Ladakh/articleshow/4329414.cms
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Be-vigilant-against-China-says-PM/articleshow/5142931.cms
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/China-projects-Kashmir-as-a-separate-country-/articleshow/5139315.cms
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